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NOTE
Rights and Obligations of Successor States: An Alternative
Theory
by Alfred R. Cowger, Jr.*
In the last fifty years, the legal implications of state succession have be-
come a major source of international confusion and conflict. World
War II extinguished old regimes and created vacuums in sovereignty
which nationalist groups used to form new states.' In addition, a wave of
decolonization led to the birth of new nations and the redrawing of na-
tional boundaries. As a result of this successor influx, property claims,
both territorial and personal, and obligations, both treaty and contractu-
ally based, have arisen.2
The settling of these claims has been difficult and inconsistent. The
traditional theories involving successor rights and obligations have never
been broadly accepted by scholars or nations3 and even seemingly
straightforward fact patterns have been confused by definitional difficul-
ties.4 Moreover, successor states joining the world community have criti-
cized and refuted the traditional rules which would dictate their
succession rights and obligations as imperialistic and self-serving inven-
tions of colonial masters.5 Thus, even if some traditional principles could
• J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University (1985).
1 UNITED NATIONS, MATERIALS ON SUCCESSION OF STATES 3, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/14 (1967) [hereinafter cited as U.N. SUCCESSION MATERIALS].
2 "Probably ninety-five percent of the international disputes involving state responsibility over
the last century had been between a great industrial state and a small, newly established state." P.
NERVO, I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 155 (1957), reprinted in H. BOKOR-SZEGO, NEw STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1970).
3 Shaffer, Succession to Treaties: South African Practice in the Light of Current Developments in
International Law, 30 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 593, 596 (1981); H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note 2, at 77.
4 See, eg., K. MAREK, IDENTITY & CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 208 (1968) (analysis of an Austrian Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that the
Republic of Austria was not a successor state because it was newly created. Obviously, a successor
state may be "new.").
5 Aide Memoire of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 81 (1983) [hereinafter
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be fathomed from custom and practice, these principles have been so am-
bivalently analyzed that their legal repute is doubtful.
The confusion and criticism does not imply that succession is to be
forever an area of dispute and contention. The key to developing a prag-
matic yet fair principle of succession is to encourage an efficient and or-
derly transition of rights and obligations during succession while at the
same time to respect the needs and ideology of the successor state. Such
rules would primarily arise from focusing on the new state as an embodi-
ment of its populace and thus only requiring or allowing the succession
of obligations and rights that aid the basically unchanged core popula-
tion. Through this approach, a clear yet less occidental basis of determi-
nation can be attained without forcing the newborn nations to swallow
one-sided or otherwise deleterious obligations, or to battle (literally or
diplomatically) over disputed property.
I. THE NoRM
Before the various propositions of successor rights and obligations
can be discussed, a definition of successor state is necessary in order to
lay a foundation on which to review that state's concerns. A somewhat
simplified, but sufficient, definition of a successor state is one which has
sovereignty over a territory and populace which was previously under
the sovereignty of another state.' This definition carries with it several
implications. First, successor states need not be totally new, since a con-
quest or annexation of a state, or a part thereof, may place an existing
nation in the position of successor state to the ceded territory and popu-
lace.7 Second, a partial loss of a sovereign's territory will not make that
sovereign a successor to itself of its remaining land since the now smaller
nation has acquired nothing.' Third, a state is not a successor simply
because the government has changed.9 Fourth, a change in government
could create a successor state. While this factor is seemingly contradic-
cited as Aide Memoire]. As Bokor-Szego states: "[T]he attitude of new States toward international
law is a living problem of relations between states." H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note 2, at 59.
6 This is the author's definition. For another definition, see 1 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCEs-
SION IN MUNICIPAL LAW & INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1967).
7 "It does not matter whether the new state has come into existence by the integration of
several states or parts of states .... "H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note 2, at 9.
8 Jones, State Succession on the Matter of Treaties, 24 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 359, 374 (1947).
This is a logical extention of the rule that a mere change in territory does not affect the rights or
obligations of a state, unless that change is complete. Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Oct.
1925, art. 26, reprinted in 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 4, at 662 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Law of
Treaties].
9 As stated by Lord MacNair: "It is necessary to remind ourselves from time to time that when
we say that a state is a subject of international law. . . we mean the state itself, not its Government.
Governments are the agents or representatives of states . Note, Revolutions, Treaties and
State Succession, 76 YALE L.J. 1669, 1674 (1967).
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tory and is in fact contrary to some declarations,10 its feasibility will be
discussed later."
A. Succession Theory in the World of Scholars
With this definition and its implications as background, the various
propositions from scholars, state practice, and treaties can be discussed.
The first, and perhaps oldest, scholarly theory of succession is that of
universal succession. This theory, dating from at least the era of Roman
law, holds that the state as a "personality" unto itself always passes all
rights and obligations to its successor.' 2 Universal succession is based on
two premises. First, the state and its sovereign receive their powers from
God or nature, so that any change in government does not affect the
omnipotent origins of the state. 3 Second, the state itself is immortal
since it always contains the "single essential characteristic" of a citi-
zenry, even if the individuals who make up the citizenry change. 14 As a
result of these premises, the theory of universal succession actually be-
comes a theory of universal continuity since the immortality of the state
combined with the everlasting power of God creates a constantly recur-
ring transfer of unchanging rights and obligations from agent to agent.' 5
This theory served the purpose of safeguarding the rights and obli-
gations that existed in the world without forcing too deep an analysis of
the international identity of states. 6 In a time primitive in its under-
10 Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 24, at 662.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 64-71.
12 H. WILKINSON, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF STATE SUCCESSION 13 (1934).
13 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 9-10. This assumption was exemplified in Emperor
Nicholas II's proclamation in the Fundamental Laws of the Empire, art. I: "The Emperor of all
Russians is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. God himself commands that his supreme power
be obeyed, out of conscience as well as fear." M. MCAULEY, POLITICS AND THE SOVIET UNION 21
(1981).
14 GioTius, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBus TRES 310-11 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925). To use an
analogy taken from Aristotle, just as the river is the same even with different waters, so is a state the
same even with different citizens. ARISTOTLE, PoLrrICS 99 (E. Barker trans. 1979).
15 H. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 13. See also I. BIBO, PARALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE REMEDIES 17 (1976). For comparative purposes the author will use as an
example throughout this discussion occurrences in the mythical nation of Prior. During her reign
over Prior, Queen Regina contracted with a foreign state owned company, Xeno, to build a barge for
her personal use. The Queen also entered into a treaty with the neighboring nation of Nahran which
granted to Nahron exclusive fishing rights for one hundred years in the seas upon which both nations
bordered, including the rights which Prior would otherwise have possessed.
Queen Regina eventually went senile and was incapable of preventing the conquest of her nation
by the nation of Successia. Under the univeral successsion theory, all rights and obligations would
pass unequivocably to Successia once it seized control of the nation. Therefore, Successia would
have to pay the barge company, Xeno, and recognize the fishing rights of Nahron. However, the
rights to the territory of Prior, including its remaining interest in the fishing territory, would become
Successia's.
16 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 12.
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standing of international law, this theory was easily understandable.1 7
Indeed, universal succession actually precluded any need for analysis of
succession since continuity rather than succession was the result.18 In
addition, the theory paralleled the idea of the sovereign individual as the
state19 since just as a sovereign personally passed the state to his (or her)
heir, his rights and obligations passed.
Unfortunately, as the world community became more sophisticated
in its international legal and political theories the universal succession
idea came to be viewed as unfounded and unrealistic. The idea that a
state's (i.e., sovereign's) powers were God-given became unacceptable,
thereby making illogical one premise of the universal succession theory.20
Moreover, universal succession blurred the necessary distinction between
a successor state and a state which has experienced a mere change in
internal government.2 ' Because of this blurring, the world community
was faced with nations suddenly "new" internally but "old" internation-
ally whose new governments felt no duty or even connection to pre-suc-
cession obligations.22
These difficulties led to the establishment of a new theory, that of
partial succession. The principal distinction between this theory and uni-
versal succession is that it was not assumed that personality automati-
cally passed from state to state. Rather, partial succession held that if
the state's personality survived from one nation to another, then the suc-
cessor state acquired the rights and obligations of the predecessor state.23
Otherwise, the new nation started afresh, free of any obligations.
The use of partial succession necessarily gave rise to two important
analytical questions. First, in order to determine if a state's personality
has passed to a successor, one must define a basis for a state's personality.
From this definition it would follow that obligations which are merely
personal to the former sovereign are not connected to the personality of
the state and thus are not succeeded. Therefore, it was necessary to de-
cide when an obligation was considered merely personal to the sovereign.
The answer to these questions, according to classical scholars, was
popular continuity-the use of the society or populace as the basis of a
17 1. BIBO, supra note 15, at 17.
18 H. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 13.
19 As illustrated by the famous statement attributed to Louis XIV of France, "L'etat, c'est
moi." As a factual matter it is unlikely that Louis XIV actually ever said this, though his attitude
communicated it. B. EvANs, DICTONARY OF QUOTATONS 658 (1968).
20 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 24.
21 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 10. In other words, universal succession ignored the status
differences between a state which has crowned a new ruling family, and one which has been invaded
and conquered.
22 Id. at 12.
23 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 5.
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state's personality. 4 By using the populace as a basis of state personality
scholars concluded that a change in the framework or ideology of a gov-
ernment, for instance from democracy to monarchy, did not affect the
rights and obligations of the state.2" Therefore, the population itself had
to change in makeup or size in order for the status of its rights and obli-
gations to come into question.
Moreover, since this theory's focus was on the personality of the
state, the status of the questioned rights and obligations was decided
upon a distinction between rights and obligations personal to the sover-
eign and those that were for the public, i.e., the state personality. 26 Thus,
if a treaty was purely personal to the king and no nexus could be estab-
lished between the state's personality and the obligation, then the succes-
sion to only the state's personality could not include the succession to the
personal obligation. Moreover, any acts of the sovereign illegal under
the state's laws would not obligate or indemnify the state since the ille-
gality of these acts made them inherently independent of the state's
personality. 8
The partial succession theory with its idea of popular continuity
evolved into the theory, expressed by Huber, of organic substitution. 9
Under this theory, the identity of the state is actually determined by its
populace, the organic core of the state. At the state's death the organic
core is absorbed by the new state. Likewise, the rights and obligations of
the state are absorbed as the core is absorbed. Therefore, rights and obli-
gations pass intact with succession because of citizen continuity rather
than political continuity.30
However, because this continuity is not political in nature, the ab-
sorption of rights and obligations was not considered mandatory, since
the lack of political agreement meant nothing exists to bind the political
entity, the state.31 Instead, Jellinek posited a duty of self-abnegation, a
24 Id at 11.
25 GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 315. This theory has continued to present times. See Law of
Treaties, supra note 8, at art. 24.
26 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 11.
27 As the Italian Minister to Spain stated in a dispute over Sicilian archives when that island
was succeeded by Italy:
It is impossible for me to confuse the personal consideration that can be shown to a de-
throned king with the rights and obligations which can only pertain to him while he re-
mains in his kingdom with rights and prerogatives which were subsequently bound to pass,
by force of circumstances, to his successor in authorities.
Letter from the Italian Minister of Madrid to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sept. 1, 1861,
reprinted in U.N. SuccEssIoN MATERlALs, supra note 1, at 483.
28 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 11.
29 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 12.
30 Idj
31 H. WILKINsON, supra note 12, at 14.
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moral duty on the part of the state to absorb these rights and obligations
in the interest of stability in the world order it is about to join. 2 By
applying this theory, the stability and continuity of universal succession
remains, though now through the self-coercion of the moral obligation,
without the identity problem resulting from an omnipotent power source
or the ruler/state confusion.33
Unfortunately, the eventual extensions of this theory disclosed its
defects. On one side, some scholars felt the moral obligation was so over-
whelming that they determined a state could not be recognized as a state
without accepting the obligation.34 This, however, made the non-
mandatory obligation now mandatory, thereby ignoring the lack of polit-
ical foundation (other than the now extinct predecessor government) on
which to base the mandate. On the other side, a flexible approach was
suggested whereby the moral obligation had to be fulfilled only to the
extent that a state could economically and politically afford the assump-
tions.3 This resulted in such complete flexibility that the subjectivity of
the decision negated the stability desired of obligations and encouraged
"moral" decisions on the basis of greed or contempt.36
These defects all stemmed from theoretical problems involving the
succession of obligations. To correct these defects, the Keith theory of
discontinuity eliminated the succession of obligations. Under Keith's
theory, obligations do not pass, as in the self-abnegation theory, but
rights do.3 7 While rights pass under both theories, the distinction is that
in Keith's theory the rights pass in essence by constructive assignment
from the predecessor to the successor. However, the prior obligations
cannot bind the new party,38 just as a contract between two parties in
common law cannot bind a third party. The result is that the successor
nation need only honor those obligations that it decides to honor, usually
in light of the practical benefit the obligations have to the nation.39
32 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 14. As I. Bino, supra note 15, at 7, stated, high morals
and ideal standards were to be applied to every international resolution.
33 In Successia's case, because the prior political entity, Queen Regina, had been deposed, it
would not be bound politically to uphold the agreement to pay Xeno, or recognize Nahron's fishing
rights. However, it would have a moral duty to fulfill both obligations.
34 PREPARATORY STUDY CONCERNING A DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS AND Du-
TIES OF STATES, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/2, at 53, 55 (1948) [hereinafter cited as PREPARATORY
STUDY].
35 I. BIB, supra note 15, at 6.
36 O'Connell writes that this fear led to theories "of a sceptical nature." 1 D. O'CNNELL,
supra note 6, at 17. See also I. BIBO, supra note 15, at 78.
37 Comment, Optional Succession to Treaties by Newly Independent States, 63 AM. J. INT'L L.
782, 783-84 (1969).
38 H. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 14.
39 B. BoT, NONRECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 6 (1968). In the case of Prior's suc-
cession by Successia, the barge would be totally personal to Queen Regina, so Successia would not be
obligated to pay Xeno. However, the fishing rights of Prior which Queen Regina granted by treaty
Vol. 17:285
SUCCESSOR STATES
While this separation of succession of fights and obligations has received
some support,4° many others have criticized the theory as a threat to
world order because of its one-sided nature.4 1 In addition, Keith's theory
is viewed as conferring too much of a benefit on successor states to the
detriment of the obligees of the extinct agreements. 2
Keith's theory survived this criticism until the 1960's. 3 At that
time, the Keith theory succumbed to a theory which advocated the dis-
continuity of rights and obligations, the theory of "optional succes-
sion."'  This theory recognized that a state's rights and obligations arise
from the legal order of its internal government. When a state is suc-
ceeded the legal order is replaced by a new government and thus becomes
extinct. Likewise, all rights and obligations to which that order was a
party are extinguished, just as a private contract would end if one party
died.4 5 Any property of the old state, including the actual territory, is
acquired by the successor state only because it happened to claim un-
claimed land first. A successor fufills obligation only by choice, perhaps
because of moral concerns or practical benefits (for example, to ensure
the continuance of vital services provided by a contract entered into by a
predecessor state).46
This creates new practical problems. First, this theory threatened
international stability since contracts and treaties could suddenly cease
without completion or compensation, and not even an obligatory moral
incentive existed for fulfillment. Second, this theory suggested that a
land rush would ensue when a state succeeded.4' That is, since the new
state had no property rights, property in a foreign state owned by the
to Nahron would be part of the state's personality, so Successia would be obligated to recognize
Nahron's exclusive fishing rights. Nonetheless, the territory of Prior, including the remaining fishing
rights, would become Successia's since the territory was part of Prior's personality, not the Queen's.
40 See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 856 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
41 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 17. The theoretical problems with separating rights from
obligations will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 96-108.
42 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 17.
43 Comment, supra note 37, at 782.
44 Id. at 783-84. 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 17 analyzes the Keith theory and "optional
succession" theory not as a chronological evolution, but as two branches of the same theoretical tree.
45 This theory was applied by the Supreme Court of the Phillipines in Aquado v. City of Ma-
nila, the Phillipines, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, MATERIALS ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN
RESPECT TO MATTERS OTHER THAN TREATIES 375, 377, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/17 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. NoN-TREATY SUCCESSION MATERIALS].
46 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 15-16. This rule was embodied in the International Law
Commission Report on State Succession. Comment, supra note 37, at 784 n.4. In the hypothetical,
see supra notes 15, 33 & 39, Successia would be considered the rightful possessor of Prior's territory
because it happened to be there first. Once again, however, Xeno and Nahron could be left without
recourse because of Prior's extinction. But see, 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 15.
47 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 15.
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predecessor could be grabbed by the foreign state before the successor
government could claim it. Military equipment, embassy property, and
foreign bank accounts could be stripped from the successor, leaving the
citizenry destitute simply because its state had changed.48
B. Succession Theory in the Real World
The countries of the world have been afforded numerous theories
from which to determine successor rights and duties. The options have,
in turn, produced a multitude of practices, even within the stated policy
of individual countries.49 In the end, like the world's legal scholars, state
practices have set no clear standard which could be called a custom or
accepted principle of international law.
As stated previously, the earliest national practices, those of the Ro-
man Empire, reflected the universal succession theory.50 With the em-
peror considered the same as the state, and all territory in the state
ultimately belonging to the king, it followed that all succession of land
from one state to another was nothing more than the personal convey-
ance of land from one individual to another. 1 Moreover: "[I]n those
times not even a newly formed State differed very much in its social and
economic order from the older ones, and consequently the earlier forms
of international law. . . were not alien to the interests of any new State,
and their application met with consent." 2 Because of its acceptance and
stability, this theory predominated well into the nineteenth century, until
the divine right of kings succumbed to the pressures of the social contract
and ended such a personal view of rights and obligations.53
The first conflict to arise in the practice of state succession involved
the treatment of "backward" territories and their "savage" nations. 4 In
the sixteenth century, scholars first argued that these nations could be
48 For example, if Nahron's royal fishing fleet happened to occupy Prior's waters when Queen
Regina was ousted, Nahron could be the successor state to the fishing territory, regardless of the fact
that Successia was the conqueror of Prior.
49 See 702nd Meeting of the International Law Commission, [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM.
192, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A (1963).
50 H. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 12.
51 Thus, when Caesar made his famous proclamation, "Veni, vidi, vici," the use of first person
singular was a literal pronouncement of ownership based on the law of successor states of the time.
52 H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note 2, at 64.
53 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 10. As late as the last half of this century, Great Britain
attempted to impose universal succession upon Israel, but was rebuffed by Israel's assertion that this
rule was obviously outdated and ignored by all nations. U.N. SuccEssION MATEiAI.S, supra note
1, at 40.
54 At first glance, the treatment of aboriginal tribes might appear out of the scope of a discus-
sion on successor states. However, arguably the conquest and/or annexation of aboriginal lands was
the first major acquisition of one societal group's land by another in the "civilized" world. Thus,
some notion of succession should be examined for sake of encompassment.
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succeeded (by force usually) by the European Christian powers in order
to benefit the "infidels."" 5 This view implicitly contradicted universal
succession because it placed the focus of the successors' obligations on
the inhabitants of the succeeded state and not solely on the sovereign's
interests, since the Christian state successor had the obligation to raise
the succeeded populace in "the scale of civilization."56 However, this
contradiction apparently went unnoticed.
The issue that did arise was whether aborigines could be considered
a state which could be succeeded. An example of this was the conflict in
1888 in the Institute of International Law. A reporting committee rec-
ommended that aborigines be considered outside the scope of interna-
tional law,5 7 which would make any issue of succession of rights and
duties non-existent. This recommendation was refused by the full com-
mittee of the Institute, which decided that it would not decide the ques-
tion. However, this nondeclaration itself amounted to a declaration
since an acknowledgment of confusion indicated that the original "bene-
factor" status of successors to aborigine nations was being reconsidered.
This confusion over aborigine nation status and whether they could
be succeeded was reflected by the practice of the United Kingdom in the
South Pacific. In the nineteenth century the United Kingdom originally
declared that aborigine tribes would not be recognized as nations unless
the "family of nations" recognized them as such.59 However, later the
United Kingdom entered into a treaty with the Maoris of New Zealand
over succession of the island to the Empire. Clearly this use of treaty
contradicted the prior British policy since, unless given standing as a
state, the Maoris could not validly enter into a treaty.'
Eventually, the policies of most colonizing powers evolved into what
could be considered a consensual practice, even if that practice never
quite attained the status of international law.61 As stated by Woolsey,
the consensual practice recognized that a colonizing power had title to
the acquired land against all nations but the Indian tribes. 2 Thus, as
successor to the aborigine nations, the colonizing power received the
right of title to the aborigine lands under international law, but also had
the obligation to respect the existing communal identity of lands neces-
55 M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1926).
56 Id
57 Id at 16.
58 Id.
59 Evatt, The Acquisition of Territory in Australia & New Zealand, in GROTIAN SOCIETY PA-
PERS 17 (C. Alexandrowicz ed. 1968).
60 Id. at 18.
61 M. LINDLEY, supra note 55, at 353.
62 Id. at 15.
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sary for grazing and farming.63 Interestingly enough, this evolution
seemed the reverse of the evolution of scholarly opinion, since the Euro-
pean powers went from an optional succession theory, under which no
fights or duties were recognized by the acquisition of the land, to a the-
ory of universal succession, or at least partial succession, under which
the colonial powers acquired both the territorial rights of the aborigines
and at least a moral obligation to respect aboriginal sanctity of commu-
nal lands.
The next major impact on succession law involved the overthrow of
monarchal dynasties, especially in the nineteenth century. At first
revolution was treated as nothing more than an internal change which
did not affect a nation's internationally recognized fights and obligations
and thus did not fall within the purview of successor law. For example,
the United States clearly accepted the pre-Constitution obligations of the
colonies and Confederation in its Constitution."4 Likewise, the French
Revolutionary government agreed to assume the pre-revolution obliga-
tions of Louis XVI with, among other nations, the United States,65 Aus-
tria,66 and Sardinia.67 Some commentators have argued that such a view
remains a "black letter" rule under international law.68
However, this view of merely internal change was challenged by the
realities of more recent ideological upheavals. The Russian Revolution is
a case in point. The overthrow of a totalitarian monarch and its replace-
ment by a Marxist-Leninist regime was such a fundamental change that
states could no longer consider the Revolution to be merely an internal
reformation. For example, the Swiss Federal Tribunal ruled that, despite
the long-standing rule on revolutions, the Russian transformation was so
overwhelming and complete that it was fatal to any agreements between
the Russian Empire and other parties. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed a
joint withdrawal from all agreements.69
The Soviet Union augmented this argument:
To lay the foundations for such a society [as was created by the
Revolution] it was necessary to destroy old institutions, economic, cul-
tural, and political, and to create new ones. This meant staying in
power in turn depended, at least in large part, upon Bolshevik ability
to destroy old institutions.
63 Id. at 353.
64 U.S. CONSTITUTION art. 7, § 2.
65 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 30.
66 1 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 98, at 385 (1906).
67 Id.
68 Identity of States Under International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 68, 73 (1953).
69 Lepeschkin v. Gosweiler, 71 J. de Tribunaux et Revue Judiciaire 582 (1923), reprinted in
Law of Treaties, supra note 8, at 1054.
70 M. McAULEY, supra note 13, at 57.
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In other words, the revolutionary government did not merely change the
internal workings of a government, it plowed under any vestiges of the
old sovereign and began afresh. The old rules of international law, how-
ever, which treated revolutionary governments as non-successor nations
were not cognizant of such a fundamental change. Instead:
Account must be taken of the fact that relations created in the past by
conquest and occupation are inappropriate to our time, and conflict
with the principles of cooperation between sovereign States enjoying
equal rights, and with the principles and purposes of the United Na-
tions. Inasmuch as the Governments of the United Kingdom and
France, and of the United States of America, accept the lofty princi-
ples of the United Nations. .. they should not impede the exercise by
[independent] countries of their sovereign rights [in succession
matters].71
Thus, some revolution-wracked nations could be considered succes-
sor states if change was fundamental and pervasive. Still, the question of
succession to rights and obligations was as confusing as ever. The Swiss
Tribunal appears to have followed the extreme of Keith's discontinuity,
since it ruled that all obligations from pre-revolution agreements were
extinct 2.7  However, in a recent U.S. court case it was held that even if it
is considered a successor state a revolutionary nation automatically as-
sumes all prior rights and obligations, thereby applying the traditional
universal succession rule.73
After the colonization and revolution periods, the next important
impact on state succession theory was World War I. An example of suc-
cession in this period was the formation of Yugoslavia, a nation born in
1918 from a union of four separate kingdoms and from territory of the
Ottoman Empire. Article 12 of the Yugoslavia Minorities Treaty was a
self-imposition of the duties of Serbia and the other predecessor nations
on the new nation, thus implying a universal succession approach to this
succession.74 This implication was affirmed by a U.S. court ruling that
the Yugoslavic formation was in essence only an enlargement of (with
the other predecessor states) the Serbian state, and so was a "successor of
Serbia in its international rights and obligations."75
An even more traumatic event, World War II, forced the world to
again confront the succession idea, especially in regard to the Third
Reich successors. The treatment of Austria represented a use of partial
71 Statement of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the Question of the Suez Canal, Aug. 9,
1956, reprinted in U.N. SUCCESSION MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 158.
72 Lepeschkin v. Gosweiler, 71 J. de Tribunaux et Revue Judicaire 582 (1923), reprinted in Law
of Treaties, supra note 8.
73 Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
74 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 13.
75 Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 573 (9th Cir. 1954).
1985]
CASE W. RES. J INT'L LV
succession. Since the Third Reich legal order was no longer in existence,
the new Austria "was in no way bound by the changes effected in Aus-
tria" after its invasion.7 6 In other words, since the Austrian "personal-
ity" was changed after the war, the successor state was not bound by
previous obligations. Albania was treated in a like manner. 7
The two Germanies which succeeded the Third Reich became a
unique source of succession controversy. Three theories surfaced after
the war to explain the nature of each state's existence, and thus the suc-
ceeded rights and obligations. One theory advanced was that of Iden-
titatstheorie, which held that the divided Germany was one country with
the same identity as the Reich, but with limited jurisdiction for each gov-
ernment. Under this theory the new nation(s) were successors but with
the same "personality" as their predecessor, and thus with the same
rights and obligations. 78 As a second theory, the Federal Republic of
Germany advanced as its official policy a Dach (roof) theory that the
organic core of the Reich was preserved as one, but the representative
governments had separate and distinct jurisdictions. 9 In response, the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) announced still a third policy in
1956 of a zwei staaten theory, i.e., a succession of two different states.8"
Under this theory the GDR refused to accede to any obligations, but did
claim rights to all property that had been within its jurisdiction prior to
its creation.8 '
In addition to these post-war states, over the last forty years many
colonies have gained independence from their former rulers. Establish-
ing its own succession policy to deal with this decolonization, Britain, as
the major colonial power, instituted the practice of implementing devolu-
tion agreements as a condition for independence of its colonies. These
agreements required that the colony agree to succeed to all prior rights
and obligations when the colony became a nation. 2 While this treaty
arrangement may have preemptively settled any possible questions of
succession with Great Britain, the successor problem still existed when
third-party states were involved because non-signatory nations are not
considered bound by the rights given to states through bilateral treaties.8 3
76 Moscow Declaration, United Kingdom-United States-Soviet Union, Dec. 1, 1943, Annex 6,
3 Bevans 827, 1943 For. Rel(I) 749.
77 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 31,
61 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1649, 49 U.N.T.S. 3.
78 Geck, Germany and Contemporary International Law, 9 TEx. INT'L L.J. 263, 264 (1974).
79 Id. at 265.
80 Id. at 266.
81 Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 856 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affid,
678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982). In other words, the GDR espoused Keith's discontinuity theory.
82 Shaffer, supra note 3, at 597. Examples of such an agreement include the independence
treaties between Britain and Iraq, and the treaty between Britain and Jordan. Id. at 598.
83 Id. at 600.
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Unfortunately for Britain, its independent colonies did not always
accede to these devolution agreements. For example, in 1961 Tangany-
ika announced a unilateral declaration to decide for itself which obliga-
tions would be respected. The declaration stated specifically it would
fulfill any obligation that was not personal to the succeeded govern-
ment. 4 This type of unilateral declaration became the norm for much of
Africa."-
While this independence movement was occurring, the Communist
bloc began formulating its own ideas of what rights and obligations a
successor state should receive. Prior to World War II, the Soviet Union
had espoused Keith's theory of discontinuity. It claimed that older theo-
ries which required the assumption of the Russian Empire's obligations
were merely excuses by which the West could interfere with the Soviet
Union's internal affairs by forcing the new nation to accept prior obliga-
tions, thereby continuing the effects of the West's imperialistic policies
which had existed in Russia and in most of the world prior to the birth of
the "new order."86 After World War II, the Communist bloc switched
to the universal succession theory, stating that this theory was the best
means to world stability. Also, Communist nations believed that, since
universal succession required a complete non-distinguishable transfer of
rights and obligations, it more closely paralleled Communist non-recog-
nition of a private/public distinction. 7
The United States has made similar significant changes in its policy
on succession. One of the most important statements on U.S. succession
theory, the opinion in The Sapphire,"8 held that a successor takes all the
rights and obligations of the predecessor state. This policy was applied
specifically by the Attorney General in instances in which one nation was
absorbed by another.89 However, this universal succession rule as ap-
plied to U.S. assumption of obligations was later amended after the Span-
ish-American War. The new policy stated that those obligations that
related to anti-U.S. activities would not be accepted upon succession,90
thereby at least in this case indicating the acceptance of a flexible ap-
84 Id. at 602.
85 Specific examples include Uganda, Botswana, Lesotho, Nauro, Kenya, and Malawi, id. at
604; Tanganyika, SUCCESSION MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 177; and, Uganda, id. at 179.
86 B. BoT, supra note 39, at 26. See also the statement of Yugoslavia in Representation of
Member Nations in the United Nations, 1950 U.N.Y.B. 433. According to some commentators, this
embracing of the discontinuity theory was actually to avoid any of the obligations of the predecessor
czarist regime. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text; E. KOROVIN, MEZDUNARODNOE
PRAvo 211 (1951), cited in I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 19.
87 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 20-21.
88 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 168 (1871).
89 22 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 583, 584 (1899) (Hawaiian claims).
90 H. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 84. The Spanish responded that if the United States was to
succeed to all rights, then it had to succeed to all obligations. Id.
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proach to succession. More recently, the United States adopted a discon-
tinuity theory, stating that new nations start tabula rasa.9
A review of other nations' declarations and practices demonstrates
the variety and inconsistency of succession theories similar to that shown
by U.S. and U.S.S.R. practice. At the time of Ireland's independence,
the question of state succession to treaties arose. From a polling of other
nations, five categories of practice appeared:
1) the successor state succeeds to the treaty-Ecuador, Bolivia, Hun-
gary, Luxembourg;
2) no succession occurs-Cuba, Guatemala;
3) the decision is "dependent on the wishes of the signator states"-
Denmark, the Netherlands;
4) the successor state is not bound except by its specific declaration-
Switzerland, Italy;
5) each treaty is to be decided by agreement of the signators and the
successor state-Austria, Haiti.92
In other words, based solely on state practice, "[t]here appears to be no
settled rules of International Law governing the succession of states."93
Thus, a survey of scholars and state practice suggests no clearly
enunciated international law of succession upon which to determine
rights and obligations. This leaves such determinations on dangerous
grounds: "[A]n agreement with 'eternal life' is foredoomed to failure,
and [imposing obligations] on weak powers by force or duress is un-
just.",94 Because such problems still exist and probably always will, an
alternative theory of succession is necessary since the "solutions of such
problems cannot be left to the caprice of a conquering nation or the bar-
gaining of a rich one."95
II. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY: THE SUCCESSION THEORY OF
POPULACE BENEFACTION
Such is the inconsistency of state practice and cacophony of succes-
sion theorists. The current state of affairs suggests at least three factors
which have affected the development of succession theory. First, the ba-
sis itself on which some theorists have formulated theories has led to
some defects. Second, the attractiveness of many of these theories sug-
gests that an amalgamation of some of their best features could produce a
better theory. Third, the refutation of many Western-born succession
91 1957 DEP'T ST. BULL. 94-95.
92 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES 53
(1965).
93 Yangtze Ltd. v. Barlas Brothers & Co., Judgment of June 6, 1961, Civil Appeal No. 139 of
1960 (S.Ct. Pakistan (App. Juris.)), cited in U.N. SuccESsIoN MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 137.
94 Note, supra note 9, at 1686 n.59 (quoting McDougal & Lans).
95 H. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 10.
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theories by emerging nations clearly implies a feeling (or fact) of imbal-
ance or inadequacy in these theories. Considering these factors, the the-
ory of populace benefaction is presented as an alternative.
A. The Correlation of Rights and Obligations
Before the main issue is discussed, the secondary issue of whether
rights and obligation should be analyzed in the same manner in succes-
sion determinations, must be decided. Some would argue that the rights
and obligations of successor states are not correlated in any way, and
thus should not be linked in a succession analysis.9 6 Nonetheless, other
indices exist which do point to a correlation and therefore require that
any succession theory cover both rights and obligations.
First, a natural symmetry exists between the ideas of rights and obli-
gations. "A subjective right embodies legal titles due to the entity while,
on the other side of the legal relationship, it creates obligations corre-
sponding to legal rights."97 In other words, one only possesses a right if
one has also devoted some sort of consideration to obtaining or insuring
that right. In the case of states, this symmetry may be as obvious as the
rights to favored nation status in exchange for restricting one's exports,
or as subtle as the right to military uniforms produced in a foreign state
that arrive with the obligation to pay for their production as one cost of a
state's defense.
While this symmetry assertion, standing alone, may be uncomforta-
bly nebulous to some, it does have support from more concrete sources.
Many theorists have treated rights and obligations as correlative. Gro-
tins correlated rights and obligations98 as did Hall who, in his discussion
of state "personality," analyzed rights and obligations as correlated by a
common nexus.9 9 The attractiveness of correlation is further demon-
strated by its use in international pronouncements. For example, article
9 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, in dictating
that states must respect each others rights and duties, recognizes the cor-
relation between rights and duties. "
Perhaps the strongest support for the assertion that rights and obli-
gations are correlated appears in state practice. As long ago as 1883, in
the dispute between Peru and Chile involving the Tarapac region, the
96 See, e.g., paper by Professor R. McGehan, part of the Second Comment from New Zealand
on the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, reprinted in PREPARATORY STUDY, supra
note 34, at 176 (originally printed in U.N. Doe. No. A/400 at 14-17).
97 H. BOKOR-SZEGO, supra note 2, at 39 (quoting L. Buza).
98 See, eg., GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 260.
99 1 J. MOORE, supra note 66, § 96, at 337. Despite the fact that this nexus is territory rather
than populace, the analysis is illustrative of the logic in using the same foundations for rights and
obligations.
100 PREPARATORY STUDY, supra note 34, at 78.
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Italian government as arbitrator observed that "it must seem inequitable
that Chile, while leaving Peru in a state of complete ruin and annexing
Peruvian territories which contain the greater and better part of Peru's
patrimony, should be unwilling to assume any part of the national debt"
which was associated with that region. 10 Thus, the greatest danger in
separating rights from obligations in matters of succession was illus-
trated: the natural legal symmetry between the two is broken, and one
party to the agreement becomes enriched at the other party's great
expense.
The United States was subject to the same argument by Spain at the
end of the Spanish-American War. The Spanish government argued that
if the United States was going to assume sovereignty over the ceded areas
after the war, it must expect to assume the obligations attached to those
territories. 102 More recently, in their agreement concerning ceded terri-
tory, France and India state that "[t]he government of India takes the
place of the territory, with effect from the 1st of November, 1954, in
respect to all credits, debts, and deficits in the care of the local
administration."'
10 3
The connection between rights and obligations has been further rec-
ognized in treaty negotiations between nations seeking independence and
their colonial masters. For example, the correlation was recognized in
the independence treaty between Great Britain and Ceylon,"° the treaty
which established Cyprus, 0 and the independence treaty between Great
Britain and Somalia.106 Even those nations which refused to accept
Great Britain's devolution agreements 0 7 often correlated the rights and
obligations which succeeded when making their unilateral announce-
ments of independence.'0 8 In short, states by both agreement and unilat-
eral act have forwarded and preserved the natural symmetry which
requires that rights and obligations be equally recognized in succession
101 U.N. NON-TREATY SUCCESSION MATERIALS, supra note 45, at 12.
102 H. WILKINSON, supra note 12, at 83.
103 Treaty of Cession of the French Establishment of Pondicherry, Karikel, Maki and Yanami,
May 28, 1956, India-France, art. 19, 1956 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFFAIRS 125, reprinted in U.N. NON-
TREATY SUCCESSION MATERIALS, supra note 45, at 86, 90 (emphasis added). See also the Treaty of
Cession of the Territory of the Freetown of Chandernagore, Feb. 2, 1951, France-India, art. VII, 203
U.N.T.S. 155.
104 External Affairs Agreement, Dec. 11, 1947, Great Britain-Ceylon, art. 6, 86 U.N.T.S. 25.
105 Treaty Concerning the Establishment of Cyprus, Aug. 16, 1960, Gt. Brit.-Greece-Turk.-
Cyprus, art. 8, 382 U.N.T.S. 8.
106 Somaliland Independence Agreement and Exchange of Letters, June 26, 1960, Annex, arts.
57-58, Gr. Brit.-Somalia, 1960 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 (Cmd. 1101).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
108 See, e.g., Botswana Independence Act, art. 17, reprinted in U.N. NON-TREATY SUCCES-
SION MATERIALS, supra note 45, at 129, 137; Swaziland Independence Order in Council 1968, art.
16, reprinted in id., at 405, 408. "Existing orders shall not affect the rights, liabilities, obligations,
property, or assets vested in the Government ...."
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matters. Therefore, whether standing alone or supported by scholars and
practice, the symmetry of rights and obligations leads to the determina-
tion that rights and duties should be correlated in any succession theory.
B. The Substance of the Theory
This preliminary determination now leads to the main issue, the al-
ternative succession theory of populace benefaction. Under this theory,
the population that is transferred to the successor nation is the focus of
the succession analysis, and the determination of which rights and obli-
gations are to be succeeded turns on which of these rights and obligations
are based on some benefit to the populace. Simply put, any rights which
benefit the transferred citizenry and any obligations which are the result
of or the precursor to benefits acquired for the citizenry are succeeded to
by the successor nation.
The populace benefaction theory contains several advantages which
the other theories do not. For one, an emerging nation need not concern
itself with a land scramble or the resulting loss of any extraterritorial
property. Any rights, corporeal or incorporeal, which benefit the suc-
ceeded populace succeed to the state regardless of what the rights pro-
tect. In addition, established nations need not fear for their rights, i.e.,
the new state's obligations, since any obligation which has resulted from
or led to a benefit for the populace is succeeded. Because this succession
is mandatory, no basis of moral obligation or unilateral declaration is
necessary, and thus no subjective loophole exists by which to ignore the
obligation. Finally, if the existing obligation is contrary to the interests
or the ideology of the populace of the successor state, the successor state
is not bound by the obligation because it is not beneficial to the popula-
tion. Therefore, any Western or colonial empire bias is negated, imperi-
alism is countered, and world order is furthered by the stable transition
of rights and obligations to successor states. 0 9
To best analyze this theory, the elements of 1) a populace base and
2) demonstration of benefaction to the populace, should be separately
considered. The first element, the use of people rather than territory as a
basis of succession analysis is logical when one considers for what reason
nations exist. Nations represent a collection of people under a legal order
in a defined territory which have the capacity to enter into relations with
other states."10 However, the legal order only exists to work on behalf of
109 No attempt will be made in this paper to show how this theory is to be applied in practice.
The author assumes that this theory may be applied by whatever states or world mediation and
adjudicatory bodies which may be faced with a succession question, just as any other international
law would be applied.
110 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S.
No. 881.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
the population and to enter into relations with other countries for the
benefit of its people."' Moreover, the territory is nothing more than the
area in which the legal order has jurisdiction. 112 Because the legal order
works for the people and the territory is only the area in which that order
functions, this leaves the populace as the logical focus of identity for any
nation.
A second reason for focusing on a state's populace when establishing
a nexus between rights or obligations and a successor state is expressed in
Huber's organic core theory.1 13 Because the population of a nation is the
integral element of the nation, it is the organic core to which any rights
and obligations of that nation are attached. Thus, to effectively analyze
the existence of succession rights and obligations, one must first deter-
mine which rights and obligations are correlated to the succeeded core
populace.
This is further illustrated by the fact that because a populace retains
its status quo throughout a governmental transformation, which is inevi-
table in any state, it must be considered the anchor of a state's rights and
obligations. That is, if "[t]he people change their allegiance, their rela-
tionship to their sovereign is dissolved: but their relationship to each
other. . . remain[s] undisturbed." '114 So, for continuity to be present in
a state's relationship to others, the stabilizing anchor-its populace-
must be the ultimate source of that nation's international rights and obli-
gations. Therefore, the succession of rights and obligations should only
be considered concurrently with the population which is succeeded.115
The next consideration is why only those rights and obligations of
benefit to a populace are succeeded. The first reason is an outgrowth of
the sovereign entity's right to do whatever is necessary to preserve, con-
tinue and develop that nation's existence.1 16 If a sovereign was forced to
either succeed to obligations made to the detriment of its populace, or to
abandon those rights which had previously aided the citizenry, then it
could not enjoy the right to aid and advance the nation. In order to
allow a new sovereign to act beneficially for the populace, only those
rights and obligations beneficial to the populace should succeed to the
sovereign.
The need for both this right of self-preservation and the populace
benefaction theory, which the right of self-preservation supports, is war-
ranted by the exigencies of history. Exploitation by foreign nations of
111 See, eg., Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924).
112 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 20.
113 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 6, at 12.
114 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 51, 87 (1833).
115 This also overcomes the problems caused by extinction of the legal order which plagued the
organic core theory. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
116 1 J. MOORE, supra note 66, § 23, at 60-61.
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colonies or impotent sovereigns has been a part of international politics
since time immemorial. One need only look to the chronology of the
Chinese Empire, now the People's Republic of China, to understand the
need for a populace benefaction determination in succession matters.
Imperial China was forced to open its borders to Western trade and
grant concessions and privileges to Westerners who threatened its stabil-
ity and bankrupted its treasury and population.' 17 If China had been
forced to continue these concessions and privileges when independent, it
would have faced the same threats to its stability and economy.
No succession theory should be apathetic to these instances of ex-
ploitation. Rather: "[A] general convention on the succession of states
should, above all, prevent [treaties unequal in fact or in law] from leading
to abuses or the exploitation of weak States by means of bilateral treaties
which have been succeeded."' 8 Under the populace benefaction theory
those treaties which injured China, like all inequitable treaties, unques-
tionably would terminate upon succession since in no way did the treaties
benefit the populace. Thus, under this theory of succession a nation's
right to preserve itself is insured and the former inequities of states' ac-
tions may be countered." 9
While the populace benefaction theory in and of itself could be inter-
preted to allow any self-serving state to bind and breach as it pleased,
other concepts clarify both the limits to and advantages of this succession
theory. The first is the concept of attributive justice, that laws are only
just when they are for the good of the society. 120 Attributive justice is an
inherent part of the populace benefaction theory since its use would
guide the ways in which both rights and obligations pass under this the-
ory. Applying attributive justice to succeeded obligations, those duties
which were enacted by the former sovereign and are for the good of the
nation are just and so should succeed to the new sovereign as a just bene-
fit. 2 ' Thus, this theory binds a successor to enforce and fulfill all obliga-
tions which are to the advantage of its people, thereby eliminating
unilateral selectivity, and allows the successor to keep only that property
which is for the benefit of its people.12
2
117 R. WESSON, COMMUNISM AND COMMUNIST SYSTEMS 74 (1978). The same happened to
Vietnam. Id. at 88.
118 702nd Meeting of the International Law Commission, supra note 49, at 192.
119 In no way would this theory affect only agreements with the West, the nations more com-
monly thought to be imperialist. This same theory would have been the basis on which Afghanistan,
upon it's independence, could ignore Pakistan's prior annexation of Afghan territory against the
wishes of the subservient Afghan people. See U.N. SuccEsSION MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 2-3. It
could now also be applied to whatever subservient agreements the Soviet Union attempts to imple-
ment with the Afghani nation in its present state of invasion by the Soviets.
120 GRoTIUS, supra note 14, at 37.
121 Id. at 265.
122 Granted, a nation could by unilateral action attempt to avoid an obligation of benefit to its
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A similar yet distinct concept is the idea of a nation's "public char-
acter," in other words the moral foundation on which a nation has cho-
sen to organize and conduct itself.123 This public character, for which
people have organized a society, selected an ideology (or overthrown an-
other), or vanquished an invader, must play a part in a succession theory
if the organization, selection, or battle is not to be futile. That is, to
avoid bankrupting a nation's treasury, stripping a land of its resources, or
perverting its ideology through the enforcement of obligations which
may have been the downfall of its former state, 2 4 only the rights and
obligations which benefit a populace and its public character should be
succeeded under international law.
This use of "public character" to determine which rights and obliga-
tions benefit a populace, and thus succeed with it, is not as radical as it
may seem. As stated previously, the Russian Revolution was recognized
as an "overwhelming" change in the Soviet nation's foundations which
freed the new Marxist state of any czarist obligations. 125 Analogously,
Austria was declared to be "in no way bound by any changes effected in
Austria" during its membership in the Third Reich since the interloper
Reich had not acted for the Austrian people, had corrupted the public
character, and thus left no succeeding obligations which benefited the
Austrian people.' 26 Thus a nation's "public character" has implicitly
been recognized already as a determinative factor in succession matters.
The support given by the populace benefaction theory to the right of
self-preservation and the upholding of public character culminates in the
first of two main purposes of this theory-protecting the right of self-
determination held by a successor state. This right has been expressed in
article 6, paragraph 2, and article 55 of the United Nations Charter, and
has become a part of international law. 1 7 Moreover: "[T]he right to
self-determination does not cease when independence or another possible
populace. However, a tribunal or mediator could then use the populace benefaction theory as the
basis for denying the legitimacy of this assertion.
123 This term was used by Justice White in his opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,288
(1901).
124 For example, the overthrow of the Chinese monarchy by nationalists disgusted with foreign
exploitation of Chinese resources and people. Aide Memoire, supra note 5, at 81.
125 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
126 Moscow Declaration, supra note 76. Interestingly, this concept of benefit for the public
character, i.e., populace, seems to have also played a role in the determination of which body should
be considered the successor agent for populaces after World War II. The Soviet Union claimed that
the Polish Resistance could not represent the successor state of Poland since the Polish nationalists
were really traitors to the national interests of Poland- the national interests implicitly reflecting
what the Soviet Union viewed as the public character of Poland. Korovin, The Second World War
and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 742, 744-45 (1946).
127 See H. ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 6, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SB.2/405/Rev. 1 (1980).
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status is achieved and recognized; it extends into the permanent defense
and maintenance of the independence or other status achieved as a result
of the initial exercise of the right to self-determination.""12 Thus, the
theory by which rights and obligations are determined to succeed will
affect the ability of a state to exercise its right to self-determination.
Not only does the populace benefaction theory inherently recognize
a populace' right to self-determination, but by its very premises it for-
wards and protects this right. By allowing a successor state to terminate
those treaties and other obligations which are not in the interests of the
core population, the populace benefaction theory ensures that a state has
the ability to exercise its right of self-determination. Moreover, because
this theory guarantees that a successor state will succeed to all beneficial
treaties and duties, it also furthers self-determination by preventing es-
tablished nations from cancelling their involvement in treaties and agree-
ments vital to the new state by simply declaring the other party to the
treaty (in other words, the succeeded state) has become extinct. Instead,
the new nation may declare that it is the successor to the beneficial treaty
and thus may demand the treaty's fulfillment. In this way the successor
state may protect the contracted rights upon which it exercises its right
of self-determination. The successor state's right of self-determination,
therefore, is protected by the populace benefaction theory.
The populace benefaction theory also prevents the abuse of, and
thus the threat to, the right of self-determination by successor states.
New nations have a duty to uphold and further the right of self-determi-
nation as a principle of international law if they wish to be this principle's
benefactors.1 29 Just as imposing inequitable treaties on successor states
leads to the questioning of the entire international legal system by these
states, thereby threatening the system,1 30 if enough successor states at-
tempted to renege on obligations which had arisen out of past benefits by
invoking the right of self-determination, they would also threaten the
right of self-determination as a rule of law. Those established nations
who would be cheated out of just consideration would soon decry the
right of self-determination and threaten its continued existence as a prin-
ciple of international law. The populace benefaction theory requires that
new nations accept those obligations which have arisen from benefits to
their core population, thereby preventing these nations from abusing
their right of self-determination and threatening its very status as a rule
of international law. As such, the populace benefaction theory supports
the right under international law to self-determination by implementing
it, and protects this right by guarding it from abuse.
128 Id. at 21.
129 Id at 10.
130 Comment, supra note 37, at 790.
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Requiring a successor state only to fulfill obligations that are of ben-
efit to it and protecting its rights over beneficial property also has its
practical aspects. Many succession determinations have depended upon
political and economic factors rather than application of international
law. This is because the existing international legal guidelines are incon-
sistent and difficult to apply without invoking unrest among the popula-
tion burdened by fulfilling nonbeneficial duties. 131 For example, many of
the successor nations in Africa recognized the desirability of legal con-
tinuity, but could not and did not care to justify to their constituents why
they were accepting all the burdensome obligations entered into by their
imperial predecessors.132 The quandary which these nations faced indi-
cates that successor rights and obligations should be tied to populace
benefaction, both since the realistic political and economic concerns of
emerging nations could then be reflected in international law and because
many successors could and would more ably and happily accept suc-
ceeded rights and obligations.
This practical aspect would further the second major purpose and
final attraction of the populace benefaction theory, that of furthering
world order, since it would help insure stability even in an unstable at-
mosphere of succession. It is a recognized duty that every state must
ensure that conditions prevailing within its territory do not threaten in-
ternational peace and order. 133 The best way for a young, probably
somewhat unstable nation to ensure internal stability is to accept only
those obligations which it can justify to its populace. Obviously, the
most justifiable obligations are those which will benefit the populace.
Likewise, the state will be most tranquil and most inclined to accept and
support world order if other nations recognize the state's right to all
property, even that which is extra-territorial, which is for the benefit of
the populace. Inherently, the practical aspects of the populace benefac-
tion theory would encourage the order and stability expected of and by
the world community.
C. Criticisms of the Theory
It might be argued that because the populace benefaction rule is not
absolute-i.e., it requires a determination of what is of benefit before the
determination of what is succeeded can be made-this theory is actually
a threat to world order, not a furtherance of it.' 34 However, such an
argument is one that posits simplicity rather than substance. Because
131 Shaffer, supra note 3, at 596.
132 Id.
133 PREPARATORY STUDY, supra note 34, at 120.
134 O'Connell made complaints about theories similar to the populace benefaction theory. See
Hoeflish, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections Upon the History of the International Law of Public
Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L.F. 39, 45.
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each successor state is necessarily emerging from a past and culture into
a different political and economic condition than any other prior succes-
sor state, theoretical absolutes which result in an "all or nothing" effect
only lead to the inequities and conflicts already experienced by the inter-
national order. The populace benefaction theory prevents inequities and
at least provides a framework under which conflicts may be negotiated or
adjudicated. The populace benefaction theory, therefore, while on its
face less clear than an absolute theory, is in the long run a far more
substantive and acceptable determinant than any other previous theory.
Several other criticisms may appear to be self-evident. First, be-
cause this theory does not require the acceptance of all succeeded obliga-
tions, some have expressed the fear that nations would excuse themselves
from an obligation simply by changing governments.135 The immediate
response to this concern is that changing a government simply to avoid
fulfilling an obligation is such a drastic measure that it would rarely, if
ever, occur. However, even if a nation were to attempt this, two barriers
inherent in the popular benefaction theory would likely prevent the effec-
tiveness of this attempted breach. First, the nation would not necessarily
be a successor state unless, like Russia or China, the change was so fun-
damental that it signaled an entirely new political ideology or economic
order. This fundamental change is unlikely in an attempt to avoid an
obligation since the government agents who effected the breach would
place their political existence in serious jeopardy. Second, if the obliga-
tion was for the benefit of the populace, no amount of change would
release the ruling government from fulfilling its duties. In fact, because
beneficial treaties must continue regardless of the degree or pervasiveness
of the internal political change, this theory is actually more stabilizing
than some of the previously described theories.
The next problem is the theory's focus upon what is deemed impor-
tant for the populace. Since the ideology of a population is non-binding
on the rest of the international community,13 6 allowing a populace to
decide which elements of succession are consistent with that populace's
ideology would seem to allow that nation's ideology to unduly influence
the rest of the world. However, as previously stated, to allow the oppo-
site-requiring a nation to succeed to an obligation antagonistic to its
ideology-is just as unjustifiably imposing. Moreover, this theory would
not actually impose a nation's personal ideology on the world, since most
obligations are purely budgetary line items or pragmatic agreements
which have nothing to do with ideology and thus would exist regardless
of, or external to, a nation's ideology.
Another possible criticism is that, by focusing on a population's ben-
135 Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 24, at 662.
136 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 2.
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efaction, those governments that are monarchies, despots, or otherwise
unelected may do nothing to which a populace consents and thus may
not act for the populace's benefit. This criticism actually misconstrues
the populace benefaction theory, since benefaction does not require citi-
zen approval any more than a government's recognition by other govern-
ments is based on its citizens' control over it. For example, the worst
tyrant can benefit his or her citizens by entering into a construction con-
tract for new irrigation systems. Actually, the focus on benefaction re-
solves the present problems of continuity when a populist government
replaces a despotic one, since the common place rhetoric of imperialist
extortion which acts as an excuse for breaching obligations would be
meaningless if the "extortion" really benefited the populace.
Yet another problem with this theory is its inconsistency with some
established rules of succession. For example, it is "settled" that a revolu-
tion does not effect the succession of all rights and obligation from the
extinct nation to the new one,137 regardless of populace benefits. One
answer to this criticism is that, as detailed in the discussion on current
succession theory, so many "settled" rules abound in various stages of
outdatedness that such an inconsistency is not only unimportant but even
expected. Another response is that these rules cause their own problems
such as the previously mentioned encouragement of self-serving unilat-
eral decision, which this theory is specifically proposed to correct.
Therefore, this problem collapses under the weight of the theories it at-
tempts to uphold in the alternative.
D. The Theory in Light of International Law
Moreover, other rules of international law related to but not actually
a part of succession law are indeed consistent with this theory. Perhaps
the most important compatible rule is that of rebus sic stantibus, the the-
ory that treaties terminate with respect to a party when the party exper-
iences a "vital" change in its nature.13 This rule indicates that
international law does not require or even suggest that a treaty lasts for-
ever, thereby giving support to a terminating concept like populace bene-
faction. Moreover, by focusing on the identity of the parties in the
agreement, this rule implies that a change in ideology may affect the
agreement as much as any other fundamental change in the sovereign
which affects its nature.
Other rules pertaining to specific sovereign changes are even more
clearly consistent. The fact that a mere change in government does not
alone affect succession interests 139 is quite rational within this theory
137 1 F. WHARTON, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 5, at 19 (1886).
138 Note, supra note 9, at 1669.
139 K. MAREK, supra note 4, at 24.
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since a governmental change neither affects the benefits of the state's in-
terests to its population nor even implies that the prior government's ac-
tions were contrary to the benefaction of the society."4 Another
example is the rule that the division or unification of a populace propor-
tionally divides or unifies the obligations of the nation that previously
represented the citizenry. 4 ' Clearly, this rule reflects the importance of
tying the succession concerns to the populace and is consistent with the
populace benefaction theory which would require the transfer of benefi-
cial concerns with the population which the concerns benefit.
Two even more specific rules are also consistent with this theory.
First, some tribunals have advanced a rule that legal liability for personal
torts committed by a government against its citizens dies with the prede-
cessor government. 4 2 Since such actions by the government against its
citizens, even from negligence, would be contrary to the benefaction of
one or more of its populace, the obligation of the original government
against a citizen is non-transferable as a non-beneficial obligation. Sec-
ond, the rule that a public treasury does succeed to the new govern-
ment4 3 is clearly applicable under this theory as a beneficial property
right which transfers to the new sovereign.
E. The Theory in Light of Ideology
Perhaps even more significantly, the consistency of this theory with
any particular national or cultural ideology avoids the problems of West-
ern bias that other theories possess. This is not to say that this succession
theory somehow conflicts with Western ideology. On the contrary, bas-
ing succession on the rights and obligations that benefit the populace is
quite consistent with the social contract theory in that both theories are
based on the idea of a government empowered by and working for its
people. 144
On the opposite side of the political spectrum, this theory also fits
well with Marxism or socialism. Actually, Marxism can treat property
and obligations in three ways. In the Hungarian ideology, because the
private sector-the citizenry-is the basis of the government, all prop-
erty and obligations are privately held since no public sector actually
140 On the other hand, a change so significant as to trigger this rule, such as revolution, would
signify the prior government was defective in some way and therefore acting contrary to the benefac-
tion of the populace.
141 1 J. MOORE, supra note 66, § 96, at 334.
142 Hawaiian Claims, American & British Claims Arbitration Tribunal, Nov. 10, 1925 [Claim
No. 84], reprinted in 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 381 (1926).
143 1 D. O'CONNELi, supra note 6, at 204-05.
144 See generally J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (originally published in
1690).
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exists.1 45 Governments, however, ultimately own all property through
the controlled economy, 146 so all property and obligations are public. Fi-
nally, in the Yugoslavian constitutional system, anything connected to
production is considered to be neither public nor private. Instead, such
property and duties are considered a matter under the collective citizenry
and thus are managed by the government but actually worker-based.147
Nonetheless, the populace benefaction theory covers all three alternatives
because it connects all obligations and rights to a citizenry and does not
concern itself with whether these matters are private, public, or an amal-
gamation of the two. In any case, rights and obligations would succeed if
beneficial to the populace and thus would not interfere with the ideology
on which a sovereign based its legal order.
Between the Western view and Marxist ideology is the varietal
Third World. It is this political sector which feels the most exploited and
is, therefore, the least willing to follow an international law which forces
it to assume rights and (especially) obligations. For example, according
to article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, original ownership of all land
is in the Mexican government, which in turn disburses the property to its
citizens to avoid foreign control.148 Populace benefaction would still al-
low this method of property allocation because the property would be
considered Mexico's to do with as it saw fit, since the populace would be
benefited by the property. However, had the original Mexican regime
acted in such a way as to harm the populace, such as transferring all
mineral rights to foreigners without just compensation, the present gov-
ernment would be free to ignore this obligation and transfer the rights to
the public as it does now,14 9 because the original obligation was only
exploitative and not for the benefit of the Mexican people.
As a final example, even the Third World ideology under Islamic
law is complementary to the populace benefaction theory. While Islamic
law recognizes the obligations inherent in sales contracts and property
transfer agreements, 150 it also considers common to all citizens any item
which is inherently unownable, for example the air or the seas.151 Popu-
lace benefaction would allow this law to continue since an attempt to
"sell" a state's air or access to the sea would jeopardize that state's citi-
zens, and thus need not be succeeded by a successor state. Therefore,
145 Peter P6zmfny University v. Czechoslovakia (Hung. v. Czech.), 1933 P.C.I.J. ser.A/B, No.
61, at 236 (Judgment of Dec. 15).
146 R. WESSON, supra note 117, at 10-11.
147 Jackson, The Developing Law of Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 9 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 281,
288 (1974).
148 A. MAYAGOITIA, A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO MEXICAN LAW 15 (1976).
149 Id.
150 H. LIEBSNEY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 210 (1975).
151 Id. at 223.
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whether the state is Islamic, Marxist, Western or Third World socialist,
the populace benefaction theory would allow a fair succession that is also
consistent with the ideology of the state.
F The Theory in Light of State Practice
The practice of states in succession matters is the final indication of
the efficacy of the populace benefaction theory. Those actions which
support the populace benefaction theory are, first, prior practice in dis-
putes involving archives. It has been asserted under international law
that "as a rule the archives concerning a province belong to it."'5 2 This
rule would not change under the populace benefaction theory since
archives and other national records are kept solely for the benefit of the
population, either because they provide information as to the populace's
activities or they help the government regulate the populace's activities
for the benefit of the populace. 153 Thus, this settled rule of international
law is supported by the proposed theory.
Another example of state practice which reflects the value of the
populace benefaction theory is that surrounding the transfer of a suc-
ceeded nation's public debt. The treaty ending World War II required
that successor nations to Italian territory assume only those public debts
"in so far as these obligations [are] attributable to public works and civil
administration services of benefit to the said territory but not attributable
directly or indirectly to military purposes."' 54 This statement could not
have more fully paralleled a determination under the populace benefac-
tion theory-debts attributable to public works and civil administration
were definitely to the populace's benefit and thus should succeed, while
funds spent on the Italian war effort had no benefit, indeed were a detri-
ment, to the Italian populace and should not succeed.' 55 State practice in
152 Communications surrounding the succession of Turkish territories to Greece, 1881, re-
printed in U.N. SUCCESSION MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 11.
153 The only conceivable exception would be those records used only for furthering a tyranny
through intimidation and police control. However, even these might be of benefit to a populace in
terms of research materials for later historical analysts. At any rate, they certainly would be of no
use to a prior sovereign.
154 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, supra note 77, at
Annex XIV, para. 6.
155 This example raises the interesting question of whether a party which has supplied or
funded the losing side in a war can ever receive payment from the victor if the losing party is ab-
sorbed. Apparently, the party never would receive payment since the successor (conqueror) state
would have no duty to assume those obligations that were to the detriment of the populace, which a
war loss certainly must be. This is not to suggest that this result is in any way unjust, given the
chances a party assumes with the winds of war. In fact, it would take great temerity for such a party
to dare approach the victorious nation, whose existence had been threatened in part by that party's
actions, and ask for payment.
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requiring the assumption of only that debt incurred for the benefit of the
population thus supports adherence to the populace benefaction theory.
A third practice which is not always considered but can have great
significance is the effect succession has on a nation's standing in world
financial organizations. For example, the debts a successor nation could
assume from a succeeded nation's involvement in the International Mon-
etary Fund or World Bank could be tremendous. The member states of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
have stated that, as a matter of international law, the liabilities of a de-
pendent territory to IBRD continue as liabilities of the state upon inde-
pendence.15 6 This would also be the rule under the proposed theory if
these liabilities were incurred for the funding of public welfare projects or
in furtherance of establishing the independent nation. However, if these
debts were incurred to fund projects which merely exploited a territory
for the benefit of the colonial power or were clearly intended for the sole
financial enhancement of the prior ruler and were condoned by the finan-
cial organization,157 then the debts would be extinguished upon indepen-
dence because the populace was not benefited.
These are but three examples of state practice which would be re-
flected under the populace benefaction theory. Other obvious examples
include the transfer of all property held by the succeeded state to the
successor state,158 the assumption of those treaties which were for the
benefit of the populace, 159 and even the undertaking of the preexisting
contractual and legal obligations of the state to its people which resulted
156 Observations transmitted by letter from the General Counsel of the IBRD, March 25, 1974,
reprinted in U.N. SUCCESSION MATERIALS, supra note I, at 530-31. This letter summarized the
view of the IBRD, the International Development Association and the International Finance
Corporation.
157 If the liability was originally represented to the finance organization as for a public good,
and later was used solely for the ruler's benefit, a different question might arise. However, the fi-
nance organization could have easily monitored how the funds were being spent by the prior ruler
and thus should not be allowed to require payment from the successor nation for a quasi-beneficial
obligation which the finance organization condoned through negligent oversight. Thus, the result is
the same, regardless of the loaning party's perception of the transaction.
158 Eg., Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Parties and Germany, June 28,
1919, art. 56, T.S. 874, 2 Bevans 43 (in which Germany gave France all "moveable or immoveable
property located in territory seceded to France"). Of course, if any property held could be shown to
be a detriment to a populace, then the successor nation would have no more right to it than any
other nation.
159 In the Draft Agreement on Transitional Measures, Nov. 2, 1949, Netherlands-Indonesia,
69 U.N.T.S. 266, the parties agreed that all "commitments which are not inconsistent with the
interests and economic development of the people" of Indonesia would die upon Indonesia's inde-
pendence. Id at art. XXII. Moreover, the parties agreed that all treaties would be terminated or
adjusted to conform with the Draft Agreement. Id. at art. XXV. Thus, any treaties which were
inconsistent with the interests or economic development of the people would die, a result favored
under the populace benefaction theory.
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in a benefit to its people. 160 These practices illustrate the efficacy of the
populace benefaction theory in a variety of matters which arise from the
succession of states.
On the other hand, the need for the populace benefaction theory to
prevent injustice from occurring may also be shown by state practice.
For example, in several cases a newly independent India was allowed to
ignore legitimate claims to civil service tenure by government employees,
contractual obligations involving the shipping of timber for government
projects and the construction of a local courthouse and licensing agree-
ments entered into by the former colonial rulers. 16  It was stated that
"an act of state can always be pleaded however unjust the result."'162
Such unjust actions would not be allowed under the populace bene-
faction theory. Civil service employees could still expect tenure since the
tenure was in consideration of years of work for the government and thus
the populace. Parties who had contracted to ship supplies or construct
buildings could expect payment from the successor because these sup-
plies and buildings could be used for the populace's benefit. 163
Finally, those licensing agreements which allowed the state to use a
private device or property right would have been for the populace's bene-
fit. This is because the license allowed the government access to a needed
property interest for the populace's benefit and because, by recognizing
the need for a license to use the privately held right, the state protected
the rights of private individuals in general to intellectual property or
other property interests. Therefore, the populace benefaction theory
would require that consideration be remitted for the license because the
populace had benefited by the licensing agreement. In other words, if the
populace benefaction theory were in existence, none of these actions, ad-
mitted to be unjust by the country's own court, could have been permit-
ted. Thus, state practice, both good and bad, underscores the need for
and advantages of the populace benefaction theory.
160 Eg., the agreement involving the Cecession of Venetia and Mantua by Austria to the King-
dom of Italy, 1866, reprinted in U.N. SUccEssIoN MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 10, which recog-
nized the right of those whose land had been seized by Venetian authorities to have compensation for
the seizure. This is to be distinguished from the situation described in the text accompanying note
142, supra, since in this instance the government could use the land for the populace's benefit, while
in the former instance any personal injury caused to a citizen benefited no one.
161 For a summary of these and other cases, see U.N. SUCCESSION MATERIALS, supra note 1,
at 211-13.
162 JId. at 213.
163 Of course, if the contract was for services which were purely to benefit the deposed ruler,
for example the construction of a private vacation residence, the contractor would be placed in the
same position as any creditor who was collecting from a private party, in this case the deposed ruler,
and thus should not and could not expect the succeeding state to pay the bill for the prior services
from which no benefit accrued to the state.
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III. CONCLUSION
The recognized theories of state succession to rights and obligations
are numerous, inconsistent, and individually flawed. Some, depend on
decisions by individual nations, thereby encouraging or at lease tempting
succeeding nations to ignore obligations which are legally legitimate but
economically or politically burdensome. Other theories force the accept-
ance of all rights and obligations with no distinction between those that
have been legitimately entered into by predecessor states and those which
are exploitative, one-sided, or otherwise defective due to duress or coer-
cion. The populace benefaction theory solves both these problems since
only those obligations and rights which are beneficial are carried over to
the successor state. Once obligations and rights are found to be benefi-
cial, however, they are in turn legally binding agreements regardless of
how politically controversial or economically burdensome they may be.
The populace benefaction theory appears to be a method of bridging
the gap between the world "establishment," whose interests are usually
in protecting itself from breaches of lucrative contracts, and the emerging
nation bloc, whose interests lie in establishing economic and political in-
dependence quickly while concurrently preserving the rights which have
always benefited its people. This theory possesses both the theoretical
attributes of equality and fairness, and the practical attribute of stability.
Moreover, while enforcement problems are inherent in any rule of inter-
national law, this theory contains enough incentives for a country of any
ideology to base its decision of enforcement or acceptance on the popu-
lace benefaction theory. At the same time the theory offers some guide-
lines under which mediation, arbitration, or adjudication may take place
should the need arise. Succinctly stated, the populace benefaction theory
is both the practical incentive for stability and the sympathetic determi-
nant of burdens which the established community as well as the newborn
nations have found lacking in previously espoused succession theories.
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